



of assisting the client in going from an impoverished Surface Structure to a complete linguistic representation -- the Deep Structure -- provide a way of systematically connecting the linguistic representation for that person to the set of full experiences from which the full linguistic representation is derived." (p. 44)

10. "For the therapist to challenge the Deep Structure is equivalent to demanding that the client mobilize his resources to reconnect his linguistic model with his world of experience. In other words, the therapist here is challenging the client's assumptions that his linguistic model is reality." (p. 46)

To summarize: The transformational grammar meta-model provides a way of moving from what the client says (Surface Structure) to the client's 'complete' linguistic representation of his experience (Deep Structure) to the set of full experiences from which it was derived. The therapist can then challenge the client's assumptions that his linguistic model represents 'reality'.

'Surface Structure', as Bandler and Grinder use the term, seems to correspond roughly to 'higher order abstractions' and 'Deep Structure' to the related 'lower order abstractions.'

A comparable general semantics meta-model would provide a way of moving from higher order abstractions to lower order abstractions. The therapist could then challenge the client's assumption that his maps fit the territory of experience. Korzybski described this model in *Science and Sanity* and it has been used by many general semantics oriented therapists and teachers. (In 1972 I presented a paper at the Conference on General Semantics in the Prevention of Mental Illness in which I discussed general semantics as a meta-linguistic system with specific applications to therapy. A revised version of that paper was recently published in the *Journal of Communication Inquiry*, Winter 1979, under the title "Self-Reflexiveness in Therapy and Education.")

Let me illustrate the similarities between these two meta-models in practice:

When the authors describe "three features which are common to all human modeling processes: Deletion, Distortion, and Generalization," they deal with what Korzybski called the process of abstracting.

To fill in deletions (the 'missing pieces') the therapist is instructed to ask such questions as: To whom? About whom? For whom? About what? Compared to what? With respect to what? Obvious to whom? In general semantics terms this involves moving from higher to lower orders of abstraction, indexing, challenging allness statements. The simple sentence, "I said that I would try," for example, has two deletions: Said to whom? Try what?

Important generalizations from a therapeutic point of view are those that set limits on the client's model of the world. Sentences that begin "I have to" or "One must" or "It is necessary to" immediately suggest the question "Or what?" Such cue words as "can't," "impossible," "unable," etc., suggest limiting statements that can be challenged with questions like: "What prevents you from...?" The process involves challenging assumptions about the relationship of map and territory.

One form of distortion the authors call nominalization -- turning an ongoing process into a fixity by changing from a verb form to a noun form -- has been called objectification by some general semantics writers, nominalization by others. Reversing nominalizations helps the client "...to see that what he had considered an event, finished and beyond his control, is an ongoing process which can be changed." (p. 74) Note that Bandler and Grinder define events as "things which occur at one point in time and are finished," a more static definition than that used in general semantics.

"Check noun arguments that have no referential index" corresponds to the general semantics notion of indexing (Who? Which one?)

"Check verbs. Connect generalizations to experience" provides a way of moving from higher to lower orders of abstraction, of relating maps to territories.

When the authors advise "Look for presuppositions," they are suggesting that the therapist identify the assumptions in a statement.

What they discuss as "generalizations of the form X or Y" looks very much like the two-valued orientation (either/or).

"Mind reading" corresponds to uncritical inferences.

The "lost performative" (person not recognizing his model as such) corresponds to a lack of consciousness of abstracting.

They also deal with questioning cause-effect assumptions, double binds, self-reflexiveness, and self-fulfilling prophecies, topics well known to most students of general semantics. An appendix gives a brief outline of transformational grammar.

While the meta-models have much in common, they differ in significant and interesting ways.

The primary advantage of the transformational grammar meta-model, as presented by Bandler and Grinder, lies in the detailed, explicit, step-by-step procedures it provides. However, its use depends, at least to some degree, on an understanding of trans-

formational grammar -- an abstract, formal system with its own vocabulary, axioms, and rules of formation or derivation. While its explicitness makes it teachable, that does not make it easy or exciting to learn. The authors do not suggest that it be taught to clients, only that they may learn by example.

The general semantics meta-model, while less detailed and explicit, strikes me as easier to learn and to visualize (using the structural differential) and much easier to teach to the client. That is, the client can learn, not only from the example of the therapist, but by direct instruction in the principles of general semantics.

A therapist using the TG or the GS meta-model would do very similar things. The models complement each other. A general semantics oriented therapist or teacher could learn a great deal from the examples and exercises presented here and would, I believe, find it easy to 'translate' from one system to the other. The authors warn that "This book is not a novel, and we recommend that you not attempt to read it as a novel. This book is a manual to teach you a set of tools which will increase your effectiveness as a therapist. As with any manual, it should be read and reread."

The Structure of Magic II, subtitled "A Book about Communication and Change" has already been published (Palo Alto, California: Science and Beha-

avior Books, 1976). It deals with other representational systems (visual, kinesthetic, auditory, gustatory and olfactory), incongruity, fuzzy functions, and family therapy.

The authors now offer workshops in 'Neuro-linguistic Programming,' based on these two volumes. The term 'neurolinguistic' is borrowed, I believe, from Korzybski, who used it in Science and Sanity. Daniel Goleman describes these workshops in "People Who Read People" in Psychology Today, July 1979: "While acknowledging that virtually all of the skills described in their models are borrowed from others, Bandler and Grinder believe their own contribution is to describe and teach these techniques. They held their first public training seminar in 1975, and by the next year, they were working at it full time. By 1978, they estimate that more than 25,000 people had received some form of NLP training, which now includes courses for lawyers, doctors, sales people, managers and therapists. At a typical 10-day workshop in February of this year, 150 students paid \$1,000 each to be trained by the NLP founders themselves at a luxurious beachside condominium south of Santa Cruz, California. And in May, Bandler and Grinder began franchising their trademark, asking for a percentage of profits in return for training, certifying, and supervising NLP leaders."

Apparently, that's gold in them that Deep Structures.

SEMANTIC BEHAVIOR AND DECISION MAKING by William J. Williams. 1978. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International.

Comments by Stuart A. Mayper

What did this title, the subtitle "The Language of Wisdom and Judgement", and the publisher's puff sheet, lead me to expect? "... a methodology to help persons evaluate situations, and become skilful in utilizing an interdisciplinary approach for making decisions ..." I suppose I had visions of general semantics and transactional psychology working with game theory and statistical decision functions or multi-valued logics to help us choose our perilous path through the crises of public or private life.

No such thing in this book: no magic formula, no formulas of any kind; nary a diagram, not even any case studies showing how the effective decision maker might approach a problem differently from the hot-headed bungler. There are just blocks and blocks of rich prose about what the author has read, and thought, and written. I should have observed the puff sheet's warning: "This is not a recipe book full of do's and do not's ... but those searching for an alternative perspective and a process which will enable them to design their own direction will be intrigued." I was intrigued, but I was also profoundly disappointed.

Dr. Williams is Associate Professor at the School of Public Administration, University of Southern California. He has written General Semantics and the Social Sciences (Philosophical Library, 1972); Uncommon Sense and Dimensional Awareness; Epistemics: Personalizing the Process of Change; and several articles in a periodical his bibliography calls "Journal of the International Society for General Semantics, etc."

The sloppiness of this bibliography is symptomatic of what I find wrong with the rest of the book. One title is listed under the authorship of both "Pitirim, Sorokin" and "Sorokin, Pitirim A." Numerous names are misspelled, and there is one strange middle name, Benjamin Lanzugie Whorf. Many writers quoted in the text as having influenced the author are completely missing from the bibliography: Chomsky, Mouzelis, John K. Williams, Putney and Putney, Bunker, Menninger, Whitehead and Russell, Adelbert Ames, and Herbert Shelton.

How did this happen? The book is a product of