

ALFRED KORZYBSKI MEMORIAL LECTURE

FROM INDUSTRIAL WARFARE TO COLLABORATION: A BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE APPROACH

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Two recent conversations point to the underlying failure of what on the surface appeared to be a successful resolution of conflict between union and management. One discussion with the president of a chemical company took place just as a strike settlement took place.

Against some raw newspaper facts, I asked, 'How did it turn out?'

The president's spirited reply was, 'We won! We made them crawl back through the gate on their bellies.' He answered additional questions, with muted enthusiasm, 'The company is in bad economic shape. We lost several contracts which would have been ours had we been able to insure the supply. But, we taught the union a lesson! It has hurt me; it has hurt my family; it has hurt my pocketbook. But, we won.'

Next I inquired, 'What was the real problem that generated the warfare?'

The president answered, 'I don't know. There were some disagreements, but they were not the real problems that produced the antagonism and antipathy present.'

Later on, I talked with the president of the union about some of the same issues. When I asked how the strike turned out, he said, 'We lost. They forced us to submit, but we were right. We will build strength. We will not make the mistake tomorrow that we made yesterday.'

'What was the real problem?' I inquired.

He said, 'I don't know. There were some differences, sure, but management took arbitrary positions, tough positions and attitudes that we can't understand.'

Such an episode of warfare happens so often, even though not every day, that we greet it without much particular concern.

Resolution of conflict between groups of people -- whether between nations, between management and labor,

the departments of a business or university, or between social agencies within a community setting -- requires the exercise of statesmanship. Permanent resolutions may be brought about through a realistic approach to the source of conflict. Whatever the circumstances, however, attempts at resolution involve people -- people who talk, make judgments, and give commitments, usually under face-to-face conditions. In a word, solutions and resolutions involve psychological aspects. Statesmen, whether those responsible for international affairs or union and management relations, are confronted with the constructive handling of differences. Occasionally statesmen are successful. Too frequently they fail (1).

A behavioral science approach, which can deal with and effectively relieve causes of conflict rather than approaching the problems by trying to treat or control the symptoms, has been under development during the past decade. The occasion tonight is an appropriate one for bringing these developments to your attention.

What is the strategy of a behavioral science approach? An analogy will provide perspective through which to view this constructive alternative. Physical medicine seeks to relieve causes of personal illness in the effort to restore personal health by applying biological theory to individual situations of pathology. Treatment is dictated by biological theory; the age of nostrums has passed away. In a similar manner, the approach described here applies systematic theory of intergroup relations to concrete situations of intergroup disturbances. The focus is on identifying the social-psychological causes of the pathology and treating them directly, rather than trying to control the symptoms of pathology by legislation, by convening committees to study the problem or by taking the defeatist attitude of crying and whining.

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The strategy of our work in the past decade is based on a two-pronged approach. One prong involves developing and continuously expanding a comprehensive theory of intergroup warfare and collaboration, which is validated through experimental work. The other prong is the application of this comprehensive theory in concrete situations with the aim of shifting union-management warfare based on mutual suspicion to conditions of mutual respect and problem-solving. We want to survey both theory and application and to evaluate the more sweeping implications for the future of union-management relations as we now see them.

From Intergroup Pathology to Health

The first questions are, "What are the causes of intergroup pathology, as seen in symptoms involving discord and conflict? What are the causes of intergroup health, as revealed through cooperative problem-solving that leads to concord? Intergroup pathology is to be found whenever there is a move away from objectivity between groups which jointly shoulder responsibility for solving problems shared in common. But, what circumstances cause such pathology, and once pathology has appeared, how can it be treated so that the intergroup system can be restored to a state of improved health?"

The Core Problem -- Win-Lose, the Two Valued Orientation, an Unsatisfactory Formulation

What is a state of warfare in comparison with one of cooperation? A state of warfare is based on a two-valued orientation to a situation of differences separating two contending groups. A major two-valued orientation, drawn by both sides, is win-lose. There is nothing in between; the cleavage is sharp. Each is bent on winning, on defeating the other, by focusing 'fixed,' inflexible 'positions' 'down the throat' of the other.

Korzybski, whose memory we honor tonight, analyzed the concept formation behind value orientations. He pointed out that a two-valued orientation can over-categorize thinking, make for mental rigidity and produce an 'either-or' approach (13). Up-down, good-bad, right-wrong, all are two-valued orientations. To them I would add win-lose as one of the greatest mental mischief makers with which society must learn to deal constructively in its pursuit of cultural maturity. Multi-valued orientations by comparison, provide mental flexibility and intellectual freedom to explore a spectrum of alternative approaches to a problem. Under these circumstances the win-lose orientation tends to disappear and to be replaced by efforts to find acceptable solutions, rather than to 'win'.

The two-valued orientation of warfare can be replaced by the multi-valued orientation of searching out

better and poorer solutions for problems existing in common and separating groups that should be collaborating. When the problem is focused in this manner, it is not too difficult to see that an examination of problems and how to solve them is very different than is the situation of taking a fixed position for use as the basis for interacting with your adversary and searching for the conditions under which he is compelled to submit and embrace the position that you had propelled into the discussion. The latter situation is what generates a condition of win or lose. The former manner of orienting the problem opens a whole range of possible resolutions, each of which can be evaluated in terms of criteria of how well that solution fits a local circumstance where the problem exists. As far as my lecture is concerned, my most significant debt of gratitude to Korzybski is focused on the point that I have described here, but there are many other points of gratitude which, though not relevant in this context, have contributed in a significant manner to my thinking. For purposes of convenience, then, I shall distinguish a win-lose approach to the resolution of differences between groups from a problem-solving approach to situations of difference between or among groups.

The first step is to describe a number of conclusions from social psychological experiments which have provided guidance and direction for shifting from a two-valued win-lose orientation to a multi-valued problem-solving orientation as the basis for a management to relate to a union.

Strategy of Experimental Investigation

The prototype experiment was designed and executed by Sherif. Two autonomous groups of children were brought into a situation of competition from which there was no realistic possibility of escape (15). In-group and intergroup phenomena generated by the competitive circumstances first were studied and, then, which conditions were effective and which were ineffective in reducing competitive tensions and conflict between groups were identified.

Our work has been concerned with the same basic problem, but it has been conducted with adults drawn from industrial organizations. Each of the 30 experiments we have conducted, which proceed through a series of phases extending over a two week period, has dealt with a different systematic problem. The first phase in each has consisted of 10 to 18 hours of interaction during which time groups develop goals, norms of conduct and performance, and power relations among members. During the second phase, conditions were created such that the groups were thrown into competition; each developed its own solution to some basic issue with which all members were familiar. The third phase began when one group had won by cre-

ating the better solution, and the other group had lost by producing a poorer one. Fourth and fifth phases have dealt with reduction of conflict and the restoration of intergroup problem-solving.

While these are the broad outlines, the specific tactics for each experiment were dictated by concrete needs to round out the details of a more comprehensive theory of intergroup relations directly useful in untangling ticklish problems of union-management relations. The experiments have been carried out over several years and have involved approximately 1,000 subjects as members of more than 150 groups which were matched, on a paired basis, in size, personal characteristics of members, and other relevant dimensions. Each of the studies has been repeated as necessary to verify the conclusions drawn.

Rationale for Studying the Win-Lose Design

A word of rationale for designing the experiments as described above will help place our work in perspective. We could have taken the route of designing experiments in which groups could agree on a joint solution through the process of compromise. Some say this type of design provides a closer approximation to actual existing union-management relations than does the win-lose design. In a sense we agree. However, rather than studying situations of give-and-take, where intergroup pathology either is absent or else is hidden from view, we have preferred to create strong victory-defeat conditions under which win-lose pathology is thrown into bold relief. The latter condition is what produces strikes and lockouts and demands for coercive legislation. Beyond this key reason, however, we are led to doubt that the absence of open conflict is equivalent with constructive intergroup problem-solving. Indeed, many union-management situations that look 'healthy' are, under microscopic examination, better characterized as win-lose situations held in equilibrium by an uneasy truce. The conditions for conflict are there, but neither side feels strong enough to fire the opening volley. Thus, we think the win-lose design to be critical for developing a theory of intergroup relations useful for unravelling factors producing industrial conflicts.

In addition, there is widespread evidence that union and management do approach many outstanding issues from a win-lose point of view. A shift away from the idea of complete and total victory is made only when the chips are down and economic and social realities intrude to blur the situation, and sometimes not even then, to wit, an 119-day steel strike of the recent past. Often, though, as new issues and realities invade the scene, the compulsion of compromise enters. It does not obliterate the desire to win, but drives it underground, with each group pledging itself to a

stronger position which will lead to total victory in the next round. The prevalence of win-lose, fixed position-taking, which generates acrimony and makes problem redefinition or give-and-take compromise more difficult, has led, on the one hand, to the development of federal, state and private mediation services and, on the other hand, to the building into contracts of arbitration clauses as a mechanism for ultimate resolution to be invoked when an impasse has become insurmountable. Yet, mediation signals weakness and arbitration speaks of failure. Intervention by the government is an unattractive court of last resort.

The realism between the experiments concerning the win-lose dynamics and situations of industrial conflict is to be found wherever a union and a management approach bargaining, grievance handling, complaints or other situations with fixed positions and with the intention not to compromise but to win. Typical areas of win-lose position-taking in present day union-management relations deal with contracting of work, work flexibility, and so on.

Intergroup Win-Lose Dynamics

Details of individual experiments have been reported elsewhere. The outstanding generalizations from them that have been found most central for understanding situations of union-management pathology and for suggesting necessary steps to develop more healthy interdependence in their problem-solving relations will be summarized here.

At the point where competition emerges, the fundamental significance of the win-lose dynamic appears. When the goal 'to win' is accepted by a group, it has spontaneous motivating power to mobilize team effort and to give it character. The consequences for intergroup life when the goal taken by each is 'to win' over the other are substantial.

Rises in Cohesion with Competition

Under the circumstances described, a variety of measurable phenomena of high predictability come into prominence. One is an upward shift in cohesion among group members. The rule is, when an adversary approaches, members close ranks to defend against defeat. Spirits go up! Former disagreements are put aside. Members 'pitch in.' They pull together toward the common goal of victory (9). The heavier turnout of members at union meetings during periods of tension is but typical of the phenomenon being described.

Exciting though it is to march together toward victory, the urge 'to win' is primitive and basic. Here is a first sign of group pathology. Disagreement, the raw material of creative thinking that can lead to the reexamination and enrichment of one's group's po-

sition, tends to be snuffed out. Failure to go along after a certain point can arouse insidious group pressures toward conformity and, in the extreme, may even lead to expulsion of members who resist the tide (14).

Refinement and Consolidation of Ingroup Power Structures

The presence of a 'pecking order' among group members is well known. Some voices carry more weight than others in defining group direction and character. In our groups, prior to competition, power relations tend to be loose, rather poorly worked out. With neither time nor performance pressures, pecking relations tend to be fuzzy and unclear.

What happens when clear, sharp competition comes forth? Stakes are involved. Personal reputations merge with group reputation. Some members who are better able to talk than others, or for whom the thought of victory carries particular relish, begin to exercise more weight than previously had been characteristic of them. In the extreme, the result can be essentially a complete 'taking over' by one or two persons. Others who are less able and aggressive and more dependent, fall in line. To avoid being responsible for defeat, still others 'bite their tongues' and are less vocal.

What are the results? There definitely is group accomplishment. A more differentiated pecking order is established. But, if those who control the major lines of group effort fail to exercise their influence in ways that recognize 'legitimate' rights of others, the seeds for civil war are there to germinate. Later on, defeat is the fertile soil that nourishes growth and development of dissension and discord. Ingroup pathology can erupt too, like Vesuvius, almost without announcement. By and large, people don't know how to cope with ingroup pathology. Barriers to future ingroup cooperation, which are extremely resistant to change, may have been created unwittingly by the impelling forward surge toward victory.

Intergroup Comparison: Elevating Own Position, Deevaluating the Adversary's

After group positions have taken shape and after they are exchanged between contending groups, members quickly develop attitudes toward both solutions. Judgments concerning the quality of competing positions are colored by membership considerations. The direction of distortion is for one's own position to be judged superior to the other, almost without regard for the quality differences between them that do exist, as can be shown by use of objective criteria. Group members strongly identify with their own position, they rationalize, or justify the comparison, and downgrade the competitor's product (6).

The indication of intergroup pathology is that win-lose conflict disrupts realistic judgment; it tends to obliterate objectivity. Yet, objectivity is a primary condition of intergroup problem-solving. When win-lose attitudes can increase subjectivity to such a degree that realistic appraisal is diminished, then the conditions of future cooperation are effectively eliminated.

Belittling the Adversary: Paper Bombs as Substitutes for Bullets

After studying the two solutions, groups interact through representatives to determine victor and vanquished. But before the final decision, a phase of interaction is provided for the purpose of clarifying similarities and differences. During the clarification stage, questions are formulated by each group to be answered by the other.

By studying the questions from a behavioral science point of view, the underlying motivation carried by them becomes quite evident. Are they intended to clarify? For the most part, they are not. They are couched so as to belittle the competitor's proposal, to cast doubt on its validity and to demonstrate its inferiority in relation to one's own group's position (8). 'Throw-aways,' 'handouts,' full page newspaper ads and company organs used to belittle the adversary and to express 'self-righteousness' all are examples of hostile messages which purport to 'clarify' the issues but which, all too frequently, produce no more than an incendiary effect.

What is the pathology? Rather than reducing the conflict and increasing objectivity, intergroup contact for purposes of clarification has the opposite effect. Conflict is intensified and heightened subjectivity promoted. Suspicion of the 'motivation of the others' is increased.

Negative Stereotypes Regarding the Competitor

As groups interact over a period of time, under conditions where the activities are competitive and mutually frustrating, members develop negative attitudes and express hostility toward members of the other group in the form of stereotypes (11, 15, 16).

Do stereotypes help clear the air? No, they do not. They have a provocative effect, because, by their nature, they are saturated with negative emotions. The consequence of provocation is counterprovocation with the intensification of conflict and with a further erosion of mutual respect and common confidence in the intentions of the other.

Let's take a recent example of how negative stereotypes occurred in the last GE strike. When conflict was at its peak, negative thrusts by each group against the other filled the airwaves. The union called management's approach, 'bargaining by ultimatum.' Management accused the union of wanting 'auction-type' bargaining. Acrimony was increased by such 'labeling.'

By blurring the real issues and focusing attention on 'labels' rather than on the existing problems, stereotyping added a further difficulty to problem-solving, beyond the issues which were in disagreement (17). Korzybski was well aware of the disturbances in relations produced by 'labeling' and he pointed to constructive ways to correct them (12).

Cognitive Distortions

As has been shown, group members develop negative feelings and emotions toward their adversary. Is this the sole source of the problem or is there something beyond? Does competition affect one's capacity to think, to understand and to comprehend? The answer is 'yes,' and the effect on mental functions is insidious. How is this demonstrated?

At the time when all members indicate subjective certainty that they have achieved intellectual understanding of the adversary's position, an objective knowledge test covering positions of contending groups is introduced. The analysis of such test results is enlightening for showing how win-lose attitudes contaminate objective thinking and for pointing out something of the character of the resulting distortions.

Shared Agreements Minimized, Differences Highlighted. Areas of literal agreement are not attended to very well, but areas of actual differences are highlighted. Items missed most frequently are identical items that are contained in both proposals. While group members correctly recognize that such items belong in their own group's position, they fail to see they also were contained in the position of their adversary as well. Communalities in positions tend to be overlooked when groups stand in a competitive relationship to one another and consequently barriers to agreement are thus created (4). You can't very well agree to what you don't understand. We have recently seen a management summary of a set of union demands that reveal the insidious phenomena being discussed. The summary, entitled 'Differences between Union and Management Bargaining Positions,' listed 62 items. It failed to acknowledge 182 areas of agreement in the two positions. Would you expect such a document to aid policy-makers, who had not even studied the original document, to gain realistic perspective for bargaining?

Knowledge of Own Position Greater than Knowledge of Adversary's Position. In comparison, items which are distinctive, that is, which are contained only in the position of one group or the other, but not in both, much more frequently are recognized correctly. But even then, group members perceive elements distinctive to their own position better than they identify items which are distinctive by being contained in the adversary's position only (3).

What is the pathology here? These conclusions demonstrate that one's mental outlook is affected by the desire 'to win'. One generalization is that there is an under-attention to areas of agreement which are shared in common and an over-attention to areas of disagreement which increase difficulties of cooperation in attaining a final result. Objectivity of cognition is distorted, and barriers to common understanding are erected by a win-lose mentality.

Without exploring the motivation for these distortions in greater detail here, it can be said that cognitive 'blind spots' are not entirely due to greater familiarity with one's own position. Differences in familiarity are a factor, to be sure. Beyond familiarity, differences described can only be accounted for in terms of group membership, feelings of personal ownership, group identification, and defensiveness under the threat of defeat.

Loyalty of Representatives

When representatives from competing groups meet to decide the winner and the loser, what is the character of their deliberations? Deadlock is the most likely result. When a representative, through exercising impartiality, and taking an objective point of view, stands to lose for his group, loyalty pressures often are sufficient to overwhelm logic. Even though the representative operates under the intellectual compulsion to exercise objectivity in judgment, he rarely does so (7). As Stephen Decatur, in 1816, said, 'Our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations may she always be in the right; but our country, right or wrong!' The motive 'to win' produces behavior which is incomprehensible when viewed from the standpoint of the psychophysics of comparative judgments only. If problem-solving between groups is to lead to mutually satisfactory solutions, objectivity in seeking resolutions to difficulties is desperately needed to substitute for considerations based on loyalty (1).

Hero-Traitor Dynamics

Underlying the pressures on the representative to stand by his group through 'thick and thin,' and 'for better or worse,' is the traitor threat. A traitor is a group member in good standing, who contacts the adversary, but who capitulates to the enemy's position and loses for his group. On the other hand, the hero is a person who wins for his group by devastating his adversary and bringing victory. Deadlock, though it does not carry with it the elevation in status accorded a hero, at least is one way to avoid the traitor trap.

In the background of intergroup contact under win-lose conditions, there often lurk the shadows of hero-traitor dynamics. To be a hero is its own reward. Yet, the behavior required to be heroic can be at variance with the actions called for by objec-

tivity and problem-solving. On the other hand, and equally unfortunately, behavior based on objective problem-solving requirements may be withheld to avoid the traitor trap (10).

Reactions to the Judge

Since the winner is difficult to determine through representatives, for reasons given above, an impartial judge is called on to make the decision in circumstances paralleling arbitration. Not being vested with membership interests, he is able to do so, usually without too much hesitation or hedging. He renders his verdict. One group wins; the other loses.

How is the impartial judge perceived? Prior to his verdict, both groups agree he is intelligent, fair, honest, thoughtful, unprejudiced, unbiased, tactful and capable. After the verdict, the picture shifts dramatically. Those awarded victory are reinforced in their positive perceptions of him. His verdict 'proves' that he was a 'good' judge. This is not so in the defeated group. The judge's ability to render a competent verdict now is questioned. He is still seen as intelligent, unprejudiced, and as basically honest. But he now is perceived by members of the losing group to be unfair, thoughtless, biased and tactless. The reaction in the defeated group is, 'It was not we who had the inferior proposition and were wrong. It was the judge who failed to comprehend.'

On the one hand, the pathology is in the inability to accept neutral judgment as valid judgment. The illness is one of erecting rationalizations which protect the position in spite of the defeat (10). A third, and equally negative consideration, is that arbitration too frequently results in warring factions absolving themselves of responsibility to work together and thus 'throwing away' the privilege of acting with reason.

Two effects of Victory and Defeat

There are still other differences between groups after the verdict is rendered. Victory or defeat has predictable outcomes which influence the conditions of successive contact between the groups.

Leadership Consolidation vs Leadership Replacement. In the winning groups, those who led it to victory are congratulated. Their positions are strengthened and enhanced and those who followed become even more dependent on them for future direction and guidance. In defeated groups, ingroup fighting and splintering into factions often occurs, as members seek to place blame for failure. Former leaders are replaced, because their ability and integrity are in question (10). Feeling unfairly attacked by their own group, they may fight back, and, if unsuccessful, pout and sulk and eventually withdraw active interest.

Group Mentality. The group mentality, 'bad' though the concept is said to be, is dramatically different in the winning and losing groups. This is evidenced not only in the reactions to the judge and to the representatives, but also in the 'atmosphere' of the group. Members of victorious groups feel the glow of victory. The dominant theme is complacency stemming from success. There is a 'fat and happy' atmosphere with members coasting and resting on their laurels rather than working. On the other hand, in the defeated groups, the atmosphere is 'lean and hungry' and filled with tension that must be discharged. Members describe their interactions as 'digging' activities focused on ferreting out fallacies of operation that led to failure. A recent example of a defeated group was discussed in the following way by the Wall Street Journal shortly after November 4, 1960: 'The Republican Party, scarcely stopping to lick its wounds after a narrow national defeat, today enters a period of protracted, intense and possible disruptive civil war' (18).

Without elaborating on details, it can be said that victory can promote a pathology of complacency which fails to come to grips with the problems of the future and which is no less disturbing to intergroup health than the destructive ingroup fighting which too often is associated with defeat (8).

Summary

The sequence of phenomena above is from intergroup competition situations in which the win-lose assumption prevails. Knowledge of these experimentally based conclusions concerning significant dynamics of a competitive relationship is fundamental to understanding union and management conflicts and for shifting it towards a relationship of collaboration based on mutual respect, trust and problem-solving, as will be discussed later on.

Generating Collaboration After Conflict

Two broad orientations to dealing with problems of replacing intergroup conflict with cooperation have been evaluated according to systematic techniques. One way seeks to relieve the conflict between groups by reducing negative stereotypes through eliminating the boundaries that separate people into groups. The other, and the more realistic for many situations, recognizes the inevitability of people being segregated into functional groupings and focuses on devising ways in which to protect group identification and membership and yet to promote intergroup cooperation.

Collaboration Based on Breaking Down Old Group Lines and Producing a Single Group

Several procedures have been evaluated with chil-

dren (16) and with adults (2), with the objective that of promoting cooperation between group members who have been locked in a prior history of intergroup win-lose competition. The motivation toward cooperation in these investigations does not arise from the personal commitment of group members themselves, but it is external to the groups. The goal in these approaches appears to be to avoid the pathology created by conflicting relations between groups by eliminating the boundaries that separate people from one another.

The Exercise of Authority. In spite of efforts of persons in higher authority to do away with hostility between groups, through breaking up group lines by emphasizing individual rather than group competition and by preaching the 'benefits' of cooperation, preferences still follow group boundaries. Stereotypes derogatory to the former adversary continue to be prominent and to persist (15).

Forced Contact Between Members from Contending Groups. Neutral contact situations, where members of conflicting groups are thrown together for work and play types of activities not organized around competitive goals, seem to have little or no significant effect in reducing intergroup friction. If anything, these situations are utilized by members of both groups as opportunities for extending hostility and conflict. Once developed, group lines defining borders of conflict are extremely difficult to erase (16).

Interaction Between Group Members Induced by Common Goals. A series of common or superordinate goals calling for interaction between group members in order to achieve a mutually desired goal, which cannot be obtained through the skills and resources of either group by itself but only through the combined efforts of both groups, can result in conflict being replaced by collaboration as each individual contributes his share to the total effort. A 'common enemy' may reduce friction between two groups by uniting them into a single entity, but it does so at the expense of producing friction between other groups. If the goal is of sufficiently strong motivating power, such as threats to survival and security or a highly desired aim, group boundaries may tend to disappear as the common goal becomes the focus of organization and joint effort (15).

Utility for Reducing Industrial Conflict. The approaches to intergroup collaboration described above, which eliminate group lines as the basis for reducing conflict, are essentially contradictory to the legal definition of the appropriate relations between union and management. One simple reason is that the groups cannot be united into one against the will of either management or the working man.

Many times, in industrial life, collaboration has arisen against a background of competition due to the necessity of company survival. The 'common goal' of

survival can serve to impel cooperation to the degree that real problems of survival penetrate the intellectual life of both sides. Yet, in a thriving, growing economy, survival is frequently insured, and since it is a need which is more or less satisfied, it does not furnish a compelling motivation as the basis for cooperation. Furthermore, many goals of the two groups are essentially distinctive, i.e., not shared by both, once the survival question no longer is of functional significance. We draw the conclusion that cooperation is an alternative to competition only when there is a shared internal motivation to solve both common and distinctive problems while respecting the maintenance of legitimate group boundaries. This approach to cooperative problem-solving is formulated below.

Replacing a Win-Lose Approach with a Collaborative Orientation Based on Shared Internal Motivation to Solve both Common and Distinctive Problems while Retaining Group Boundaries

If cooperation between groups is the shared goal, because both groups stand to gain more through this approach to relations between themselves than they stand to achieve by competing in order to 'win,' totally different routes are taken in order to skirt away from conflict. The approaches to be described have been employed successfully in four union and management warfare situations, sufficient to establish that groups locked in conflict with one another can reestablish a collaborative relationship. One of the practical considerations involved is that against a history of conflict the motivation to collaborate frequently is present at an action level in only one of the two contending groups. The first four steps outlined, laboratory sensitivity and skill training, norm-setting conferences and behavioral science intervention, are applicable when collaboration is being achieved through the efforts of only one group. This is not to say that both groups can not simultaneously engage in these activities but that it is feasible for one group alone to take this path. The next two procedures are ones which require the shared motivation of both groups to work toward collaboration.

Training in Theory and in the Recognition of Phenomena Associated with Win-Lose Conflict. Deeplying human attitudes are not changed by an expert's telling how 'it should be,' or even pointing the way. Yet a first step toward changing attitudes can be taken if one can understand his own reactions toward warfare through experiencing them in the direct 'heat' of conflict, and then talking about them in a systematic manner. Needed in order to correct faulty reactions is to create conditions under which direct experience and the resulting abstractions regarding it bear a more valid relationship to one another.

1. Recognition of Intergroup Dynamics. A laboratory training program in which participants experience directly, through the involvement of their own actions, thinking, and emotions, the conditions that arouse intergroup hostility and conflict and compare these experiences with the conditions necessary to bring about collaboration, is a first step in shifting mental attitudes towards cooperation through comprehension of systematic theory and through valid, personal recognition of phenomena associated with win-lose conflict (2). Included in such a program are miniature situations of intergroup conflict in which participants experience directly the generalizations outlined above. Recognition of intergroup dynamics in terms of a systematic framework is requisite to shifting to cooperative behavior.

2. Avoiding the Psychodynamic Fallacy. In the failure to recognize intergroup dynamics, incorrect, personality-based ascription of motivation for warfare often is given. This is the psychodynamic fallacy, and it occurs when the motivation for behavior of a person is incorrectly attributed to factors 'within him' rather than to group or intergroup dynamics acting on him. For example, a pathological condition may be contained in the statement, 'He is a hostile, aggressive person,' if the reference is to the attack by an adversary on one's own representative. With awareness of how dynamics of intergroup conflict act in a more or less standardized manner on any representative, the more valid interpretation is to attribute the behavior to distortions in judgment in the direction of devaluating and belittling the adversary, as demonstrated earlier. Such an altered interpretation can serve to reduce the 'hot' emotion of wanting to attack a 'destructive' person. Similarly when union officers are viewed by management as representatives, committed to a fixed position under win-lose conditions, with the traitor threat behind their intractableness, then proper emphasis can be placed on the conditions surrounding the behavior that 'cause' resistant actions to appear. By such a correct orientation, this psychodynamic fallacy effectively can be avoided. A change in attitude and action can be achieved, not by hoping for replacement or defeat of an aggressive union officer who is mistakenly seen as an 'unreasonable' person, but by working towards changing the conditions that, in fact, do account for the behavior.

3. Avoiding the Self-Fulfilling Prophecy. Another dynamic, the self-fulfilling prophecy, also operates to cause one to misplace motivation and to assess intent incorrectly by failing to recognize intergroup factors in the situation. The self-fulfilling prophecy is a prophecy made by one's self which, in experience, is fulfilled. The fulfillment is not because it was an accurate prediction, but because the person who made the prophecy altered his own actions in such a way as to cause his expectations to be met in the behavior of the other. Fur-

thermore, when his expectations are met, he misperceives the event and is unaware of how his own behavior exerted an influence on the behavior of another.

Recognition of the way in which the self-fulfilling prophecy operates is particularly significant in situations where intergroup conflict has ruled the day, and where negative stereotypes are rampant. One is most likely to react automatically towards a member of an adversary group in terms of negative stereotypes which are a reflection of competitive relationships. Members of one group, though espousing that they want to cooperate, in fact, often give off signals of conflict. When their attacking, conflictual cues are correctly read and reacted to by another group, this only 'proves' that the second group was unwilling to cooperate. The pathology thus produced can be avoided by both understanding the dynamics of the self-fulfilling prophecy and also by awareness of the way in which automatic assumptions, particularly derogatory stereotypes, are conditioned by the nature of the intergroup relations.

Laboratory Skill Training in Procedural Steps Leading Toward Intergroup Cooperation. Recognition of the dynamics of intergroup conflict is indispensable, but insufficient. Concrete and practical procedures which facilitate collaboration are needed in order to accomplish it. Each of the validated procedural steps that aid intergroup cooperation formulated below are pointed toward avoiding some pathology of intergroup conflict. In laboratory training programs after the sensitivity and recognition phases described above, the next step is to move into learning concerned with the actual concrete steps that facilitate cooperation between groups, as described below.

1. Problem Definition Based on Facts Defined under Conditions of Interdependence. As the basis for solving problems that separate groups, facts are a substitute to the wedding to one's own group's formulation of facts from its own point of view alone. Facts that are interdependently agreed upon serve to diminish greatly, sometimes to eliminate entirely, the perceptual and attitudinal selectivity produced by viewing a situation solely from one's own point of view.

Many times, a disagreement between two groups comes about because the problem is defined independently by both sides, each in terms of their own ingroup perceptions. This is likely to mean that solutions proposed by members from different groups meet their own criteria of what the problem is and, thus, share little in common. When problem identification is achieved by joint action on the part of the groups involved and where it is based on shared fact-finding rather than on ingroup perceptions, a substantial foundation is provided for obtaining mutually satisfactory resolutions of differences.

2. Range of Alternatives vs. Fixed Position-Taking. When it is not feasible for groups to develop the solutions

together, then each group's presenting a range of alternatives as possible ways to resolve the difficulty is more conducive to obtaining better end-products than when both groups present only their most preferred position to the other, fail to consider alternatives, or keep them hidden.

Approaching another group with a fixed position as the best and only one is like hurling a challenge to one's adversary. There are several reasons why. Locking of attitudes and commitments to the 'one best way' that is our way flows almost inevitably from a fixed position. Members become wedded to their position, and the stage is set for cognitive distortions, inability to comprehend communalities and all of the biases in judgment demonstrated above. The point is that by settling initially on one's position as a basis from which to work, sides are drawn more sharply, and necessary flexibility and tentativeness of the kind that come from starting with a number of alternatives as a provisional basis for interaction are lost.

In addition to the negative attitudes that are likely to arise, it also is probable that a solution to a problem separating two groups which is proposed by only one group is not likely to be so superior in quality as is a solution that emerges from their joint deliberations. When the stated aim is to develop several alternatives, an added push is given in the direction of seeking for better ways to solve a problem rather than being tempted to seize upon the first that appears feasible. Final positions that emerge from the interaction and pooled thinking of people with different points of view are likely to be superior in quality to the one position produced by either group in isolation, as judged in terms of meeting the common and distinctive needs of both groups.

Bulwerism sadly fails to recognize this state of affairs.

3. Seeking Communalities along with Tackling Differences. When groups have one or a series of preferred positions, the appropriate point of departure is to clearly establish points of similarity in the proposals. Testing for comprehension and intent underlying the proposal from another group is critical in arriving at a mutually acceptable solution. Because of the insidious and relatively 'silent' nature of the cognitive distortions, under conditions of intergroup conflict, the importance of this step can hardly be overestimated. Group members feel subjective certainty of comprehension, so that the biases due to membership affiliation, perspective and experience constitute built-in 'blindnesses' which are difficult to overcome. It is easy to skip this step of seeking communalities and immediately to seize upon differences between positions. But then, differences tend to be magnified into insurmountable barriers rather than to be perceived in the perspective of similarities. Often areas of agreement between groups are much greater than appear on first glance or even on a second or third look.

4. Avoiding the Traitor Threat through Increased Participation of Members in the Problem-Solving Process. Possibly one of the greatest barriers to intergroup cooperation through representative interaction stems from the traitor threat which involves loss of status and rejection of 'disloyal' persons who go against their group position even though there is an objective, logical, factually based rationale for their doing so. When appropriate emphasis is placed on avoiding the motivating power of the hero-traitor dynamic, experimentally validated procedures can be employed to reduce obstacles to problem-solving that are anchored to the plight of the representative.

A representative speaks as one voice for a group and thus gives the appearance of unanimity among the ingroup. Rarely is this the case. Involvement of more people in problem identification, in suggesting alternatives for solutions, and in testing of feasibility provides for divergencies in opinions to be aired more fully and brings a greater number of points of view to bear on solving the problem. The wider the involvement in the actual problem-solving sequence itself, the greater the commitment to a solution once it is obtained. The use of representatives is in part based on the notion of expediency of concentrating effort in a few and thus avoiding 'unnecessary' expense and time. But, the longer decision-time required by spreading participation can lead to quicker acceptance and greater commitment.

5. Keeping the Group with the Representatives vs. Representatives' Diverging from Group Positions. Although it may be impossible to involve an entire group, or even a sizable portion, in the problem-solving procedure, more frequent contact between representatives and constituent groups, as agreements are being formed, also can be employed to avoid the traitor threat. The reason is that a representative can keep his group changing with him as he shifts a position. This means that a 'package' which has been bargained in private is not withheld for presentation until all details are ironed out smoothly. The 'holding until done' procedure has the earmarks of presenting the conclusions reached without providing the rationale on which the conclusions are based. Not having been through the steps of thinking through implications and examining a variety of alternatives, constituent groups may have little basis for realistically evaluating the product except in terms of degree of difference from an original position. Advance thinking by cross-checking with members before changes in position are made means that the group is moving with the representative, rather than the representative's moving away from the original position or disposition of the group.

Some 50 of these laboratory training programs, conducted within companies for members of management,

have been completed to date. The conclusion is appropriate that such learning has, in itself, contributed positively to union and management cooperation.

Norm-Setting Conferences for Achieving Uniformity of Attitudes. A second step consists of group norm-setting where the aim is to achieve uniformity in opinion and attitude with respect to the orientation to intergroup relations to which participants are committed. If a shift is to be made, it cannot be done by changing individuals in isolation from the social framework in which they operate; to do so would be to increase the traitor threat. In addition, no one person in the group, even the highest ranking one, can with assurance of success compel by edict a group to shift from warfare to cooperation. Therefore, in order to consolidate attitudes as the basis for future action, norm-setting conferences are used, in which actual participants talk through their own attitudes, reservations, doubts, hopes, and so on, concerning cooperation as an orientation to a former adversary. Once a group as a whole has a shared perception of such a goal and commitment to it, energies of many individuals can be released and focused in the same direction. People can move with assurance of the support of others (5).

Behavioral Science Intervention Concerning Ongoing Organization Behavior. The third step in translating theoretical concepts into concrete behavior is through the use of a behavioral scientist to intervene in ongoing activities of interaction between groups. Against a background of intense conflict which is real to the persons involved, even laboratory type of 'learning-through-experience' can be washed away and lose its significance in the intense heat of battle. It is at these points that the outsider can step in and 'freeze' a problem situation long enough to recast it into theoretical terms so that alternative ways of behaving can be examined before a precipitous, incendiary win-lose event occurs. If there is heavy tension, then it is all the more important that alternatives be explored before an action is taken, yet it is often very difficult to resist slipping into 'second nature' habits and modes of thinking that group members may have become accustomed to over 20 or 30 years. It is at these critical points that a behavioral scientist can help by recasting an ongoing situation into theoretical terms (5).

Another way of formulating the concept of behavioral science intervention in organizational activities is possible by comparing it with the more typical sociological orientation. A sociologist, under similar circumstances, might attend meetings and engage in problem-solving conferences, but as an observer making copious notes on details concerning person-to-person interactions, and so on. However, he would

seek to avoid influencing the actual problem-solving sequence itself, to shift the conclusion in one direction or another according to theoretical considerations. That is, he would remain passive as regards the activity, though he would be active in measuring it.

By comparison, the behavioral science interventionist takes a direct role in the interactions, not from the point of view of suggestions concerning the content being discussed, but rather from the standpoint of presenting theoretical alternatives for examining the relationships likely to arise from different courses of action.

Dealing Directly with the Tensions between Conflicting Groups through Leveling Conferences. Two additional procedures are useful for erasing conflict between groups. They both involve the contending groups themselves tackling the differences existing between them. The intergroup leveling conference, described first, can be inserted at any place in developing relationships where tensions rise to the point where collaboration efforts are being stifled.

Rather than convening for an accusation and counteraccusation session, the warring factions explore with one another the attitudes, feelings, and emotions that undergird disrespect, distrust and the motivation to frustrate and destroy. Amazing though it is, once leveling starts, the tension in the situation is reduced. People are telling one another the very attitudes they ordinarily withhold -- the underlying ones which 'explain' the mutually destructive surface actions.

With leveling started, usually through a behavioral science intervention, the way is opened for much more extensive joint exploration of history leading to the present situation. An historical review, covering a decade, offers the advantages of placing present conflict in perspective, providing diagnostic cues to account for the present dilemma, and offering suggestions for the kinds of altered thinking necessary to achieve success against a background of failure.

Intergroup Therapy. Intergroup therapy is a more extensive and structural approach which is useful for digging directly into the sources of intergroup pathology rather than skirting around surface symptoms. The rationale underlying intergroup therapy is that groups may hold perceptions and stereotypes of one another which are distorted, negative, or so hidden that they prevent functional interrelationships from arising. Only after basic problems of relationship have been eliminated is effective interaction possible. Intergroup therapy is an extension of leveling conferences as described above.

Contending groups are brought together as groups. In private, each discusses and seeks to agree on its perception and attitudes toward the other

and its perceptions of itself as well. Then representatives of both groups talk together in the presence of other group members, under conditions where all others are obligated to remain silent. During this phase, representatives are responsible for accurate communication of the picture that each group has constructed of the other and of itself. They are free to ask questions for clarification of the other group's point of view, but ground rules prevent them from giving rationalizations, justifications, etc. The reason for using representatives is that communication remains more orderly and responsibility is increased for them to provide an accurate version of the situation. Members of both groups then discuss in private the way they are perceived by each other in order to develop understanding of the discrepancies between their own view of themselves and the description of them by the other side. Finally, again working through representatives, each helps the other to appreciate bases of differences, to correct invalid perceptions, and to consider alternative explanations of past behavior. Fundamental value conflicts not based on distortions also can be identified and examined. Then, suggestions can be developed for ways of working on problems which can result in solutions apart from basic value conflicts.

Summary. The replacement of symptoms of intergroup pathology by successful intergroup cooperation in achieving common and distinctive needs of two groups can be achieved without weakening the boundaries between the groups. Significant insight can be gained through laboratory training in the dynamics of win-lose conflict in which benchmarks of intergroup pathology are experienced. Laboratory training is also useful for spelling out procedures designed to avoid the pitfalls of win-lose conflict. Norm-setting conferences are employed for establishing uniformity of attitude and commitment to group goals toward which all members can strive. The aid of a behavioral scientist interventionist is an additional procedure through which systematic knowledge regarding conditions of warfare and collaboration can be brought to bear in actual settings.

The procedures above have been employed successfully by one group in an intergroup conflict situation as the basis for shifting to a cooperative relationship. In addition, leveling sessions participated in by contending groups serve to 'clear the air.' Finally, when both groups take part in intergroup therapy, the basic causes of pathology can be reached for remedy rather than skirting the surface of the symptoms.

Conclusions

Some problems of society, having been with us for so long, come to be accepted as permanent maladies and as inevitable. With an air of resignation, the attitude is 'You learn to live with it as best you can.' The unfortunate result of such fatalism is that the malady, having been accepted as permanent, is not subjected to the kind of intensive scientific inquiry that is needed, and that, if successful, could return its victims to a state of health. So it is with union-management relationships and with other types of conflictual contact between groups, such as is now taking place on the international scene. Intergroup conflict is not inevitable. Indeed, its psychological properties already are rather well understood. Tests of the theory in application demonstrate its utility for bringing about the cessation of hostilities and replacement of civil war with enlightened statesmanship.

The gate is open for a period of reconstruction and improvement of human conditions. Causes of the malady are understood. Treatment methods are available. The way to move forward is known.

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