said shaft, at least one of said plates being rotatably carried by said shaft, means for adjustably spacing at least one of said plates from the other while said crusher is running, and an instantaneous assembly as heretofore described.

Far more of course than in the administration of the Patent System is the need for extensional thinking in the relationship to the Patent System to other 'systems' in our culture—'economic,' 'social,' etc. which are all inextricably related. In fact it would appear that most of them are in themselves extensionally governed to a fairly high degree. It is in the matter of relating that we are so miserably disorientated and it is the view of general semanti-ctists supported by constantly accumulating empirical evidence, that this is fundamentally due to our verbally too clean-cut, anthropomorphically based language structure which departmentalizes knowledge into false-to-fact subject-matter—'history,' 'geography,' 'economics,' etc.

* Well known mechanisms having this type of name are 'Servo,' 'Simplex,' etc., and in connection with this proposal the reader will readily recall the Markush case. There a group of chemicals having no ready-made collective label were found to have certain useful characteristics in-common, for which reason alternative claiming was permitted in view of 'the paucity of language.' Why couldn't Markush have invented a word to stand for or symbolize those characteristics, defining such word in the body of his description?

A SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENT IN SEMANTIC USAGE*

A. H. MASLOW

During a period of rapid development in a science, many new concepts are invented and old ones given new meaning. There have usually been only two horns to the dilemma posed by the necessity for changing terminology. The first has been to coin new words; the second has been to use extant words, frequently from the lay vocabulary, giving them, however, a new, a more exact, or a more restricted definition. Like many others, I have tried both and have found that neither works well. Neologisms are usually ignored; and, where rigid definition has been given to old words, many psychologists have continued to use these words as they always had before. The result is unnecessary misunderstanding, pseudo-debates and other purely semantic (rather than scientific) battles and confusions.

I wish to offer a third possible alternative which I have tried out in my classes and found to work very well. It is simply to recognize that the same word can be used by different authors in partially or completely different ways. This is done by accepting the words that the various authors have used, appending to them, however, as a subscript, the author's name, which indicates that we are using these

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ETC.: A REVIEW OF GENERAL SEMANTICS

words as the particular author used them and in no other way. As my students become familiar with such concepts as 'behaviorism\textsubscript{Watson}', or 'behaviorism\textsubscript{Tulv}', or 'behaviorism\textsubscript{Olman}', I can eventually shorten the subscripts to the authors' initial alone, \textit{i.e.}, 'behaviorism\textsubscript{w}', or 'behaviorism\textsubscript{t}', or 'behaviorism\textsubscript{p}'. A few other concepts for which I have found this procedure useful are field\textsubscript{Lewin}, abstract Goldstein, emergency\textsubscript{Cannon}, sex\textsubscript{Freud}, connection Thordike, etc. It has also been helpful to speak of behaviorism\textsubscript{Gestalt} (behaviorism as the Gestalt psychologists describe it), and Gestalt psychology behaviorist (Gestalt psychology as the behaviorist writers describe it). The theoretically minded psychologist will notice here the interesting parallel to the so-called operational definition, or, to be more exact, 'operational definition\textsubscript{Bridgman}'.

A further, though subsidiary, advantage of this usage is in the explicit labeling of what could be called the 'intramural word.' We all know that, for pedagogical purposes, we may use words within our own classrooms in a manner that we never would in a formal publication. These may be purely heuristic words, the slang of the moment, exaggerations humorous or whimsical, or paradoxical definitions which could never endure serious examination. Such words can be very useful nevertheless, for they may help to set the stage for serious discussion, or may be used to enlist interest and attention to what is to follow, or they may indicate that the discussion to follow, though narrow, is set against a broad background, etc. As an illustration, I recall a most interesting lecture in which the speaker's first sentence was 'Psychiatry is the art of applying a science which does not yet exist.'

From this usage, which all teachers (and all good conversationalists) know and use freely, may be derived the concept of an 'intramural word,' that is, a word which has only arbitrary, momentary and local meaning, \textit{i.e.}, only in this conversation, only at this time, in this place and for these people. To avoid producing confusion in the occasional student who is so humorless that he takes the usage quite seriously, and to avoid the embarrassment of having students quote such usages outside the classroom to people who cannot understand them, I have found it useful to append the subscript \textsubscript{int} both in lecturing and in writing. The same thing could be done by the psychologist using an 'intramural' word in the course of a single lecture or paper, for the sake only of temporary communication with the reader. He can thereby explicitly disavow any intention to propose the word seriously for inclusion in the general glossary of psychology.

GENERAL SEMANTICS IN EDUCATIONAL PRACTISE

HERBERT J. COGAN

How strange that most of our recent educational disputes have centered about the content of education, rarely a method of teaching. Should students read the 'hundred great books,' or shall they be free to elect a major subject, or should we perhaps temper too much academic freedom by prescribing a year or two of compulsory comprehensive courses? This concern over content was abetted by the