

# THE FULLY FUNCTIONING PERSONALITY\*

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SINCE the theme of this conference is "The Search for Security," let me start by contrasting two views of security, namely, the static and the dynamic. The static concept of security may be pictured by thinking of the oyster inside its shell, the frightened person behind his neurotic defenses, or pre-war France behind the Maginot Line. The main idea in the static concept of security is to build up enough protective walls and to sit still inside them. The "search for security" for many people still is the task of building and mending walls around oneself.

The dynamic concept of security can be pictured by thinking of a skillful and self-confident driver speeding home in the traffic stream along Bayshore highway. He knows that the highway is dangerous; he knows that he may encounter drunken drivers or cars with faulty brakes, and he knows that a slight error in judgment at 60 miles an hour may result in his not getting home at all. Nevertheless, he is not insecure, he is not frightened; in fact, this daily confrontation of danger doesn't worry him at all, because his security in this dynamic and dangerous situation depends not on walls to protect him from danger, but on internal resources—skill, knowledge, experience, flexibility—with which he knows he can cope with danger.

And in this choice of examples I think I have already indicated that the static concept of security is an illusory one, except perhaps for oysters. Against the background of far more profound psychological experience and knowledge than I can bring to bear on the subject, other speakers at this conference have spoken and will speak of how one cultivates through proper teaching and child-rearing methods and self-criticism, the kind of dynamic, inner security which is the goal of education and psychiatry in our times. I shall leave these matters for others to discuss; I myself should like to discuss the question, "Assuming that the search for security has been successful so that you have developed a

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person who is genuinely free of neurotic anxieties, and therefore free of needless defensive reactions, what would he (or she) look like? What sort of a person would a genuinely sane individual be? What would he be like to have around, to talk with as a friend, to work with as a colleague? That is, how does he distinguish himself from people like us?"

The reason I am interested in this topic is that I have been reading recently some psychological literature on the subject of emotional health. This sort of reading is both rare and interesting, because as you know, there is plenty of literature on neurotics and psychotics, telling us how we get to be the messes we are—that is, through being bottle-fed, through being toilet-trained too severely, through living in an over-competitive culture, through having sexual inhibitions or through having not enough of them, through having had the wrong parents, or through having been subjected to the wrong methods of education, and so on. We have thousands of descriptions of emotional disturbance and its causes, but we have too few descriptions of emotional health. And so, as I say, what does a sane person look like?

ONE of the bases of my inquiry to this question arises from Korzybski's claim that he had given the first clear, definite functional definition of sanity. The sane individual, he said, does not confuse levels of abstraction; he does not treat the map as if it were the territory; he does not copy animals in their reactions and therefore is not a *dogmatist* or a *categorist* (the pun is Korzybski's, not mine); he does not treat as identical all things that have the same name; he does not exhibit two-valued orientations in which absolute good is pitted against absolute evil; he does not confuse reports with inferences, inferences with judgmental statements; he is cautious about applying generalizations to particulars.

You will note that this description that Korzybski gives is a negative description, because it says so many things that the sane individual does *not* do. Of course there are positive elements in Korzybski's description of sanity, too. They are to the effect that the sane individual is extensionally oriented (that is, he is fact-minded rather than word-minded), he is conscious of his abstracting and of his projecting processes, he is relaxed rather than rigid or defensive, and he is cooperative and mature in his orientations.

Now I don't want to argue with Korzybski's concept of sanity, which I believe is as good as any you can find; nevertheless his account of sanity is at a fairly high level of abstraction. He said, for example, that if our evaluative processes were not crippled by built-in misevaluations, we would all function so well that we could all be regarded as geniuses. Some people have laughed at Korzybski because they thought that he made a vast over-statement when he said this, but I don't think there is anything to laugh at here. We all know people, including people who are very dear to us among our friends and relatives, who we feel would be enormously creative if they only got the bugs out

of their systems. Often we feel that way about ourselves. Hence, to cease being crippled by unsound evaluative habits does not seem an unrealizable goal. Maybe we could all be geniuses, or at least a little less removed from the genius class, if we knew how to overcome our miscalculations. But again let me call attention to the fact that the main emphasis of Korzybski's description of sanity is a negative one, that is, that we must stop doing the things we do now that prevent us from functioning better. And so we do not get a picture from Korzybski of the semantically liberated or the sane individual.

The kind of literature I have been reading lately and from which I shall abstract some passages tonight is exemplified by the work of Professor A. H. Maslow of Brandeis University, who has done a study of what he calls the "self-actualizing person." This is a portion of his book called *Motivation and Personality* which has recently been published. Also, I should like to talk about Dr. Carl Rogers, at the University of Chicago, who has been trying to isolate the characteristics of what he calls the "fully functioning person" or the "creative person." From these books and others in the same general direction, we get a picture of what modern psychologists—specifically those psychologists whose position is most closely allied to that of general semantics—regard as the psychologically healthy person, that is, the person whose search for security has been successful.

So let's talk about the "genuinely sane person" or, to use Carl Rogers' term, the "fully functioning person." What does he look like? Who is this character? Dr. Rogers' theories are based upon an extrapolation beyond the facts abstracted from successful cases of therapy that he has seen, and the materials for his pictures of the "sane person" are then the experiences and observations of a psycho-therapist.

Maslow approaches his idea of the "sane person," whom he calls the "self-actualizing personality," from a different source. He defines the "self-actualizing person" as one who makes "full use and exploitation of his talents, capacities, and potentialities." These people, he says, "seem to be fulfilling themselves and to be doing the best that they are capable of doing. They are people who have developed or are developing to the full stature of which they are capable." In order to isolate the characteristics of the "self-actualizing personality" Maslow started with a rough definition and applied it to those of his friends, acquaintances and students who seemed to fill the bill. He also studied a number of historical characters or living personalities, about 60 or 70 people altogether, who seemed to meet the requirements. He does not, of course, give the names of all the persons he has studied. Some of them were famous, some obscure. Some whom he thought to be self-actualizing turned out, on closer examination, not to be as healthy as they looked at first. After much careful screening he narrowed down his list to some 40 people whom he found to be self-actualizing to a large degree.

And so I shall lump together Carl Rogers' "fully functioning person" with Maslow's "self-actualizing personality" and call this combined abstraction the "genuinely sane individual."

THE MOST impressive fact, as described by both Rogers and Maslow, is that these sane people are not, in the ordinary sense of the term, "well-adjusted." The unreflective layman and many school teachers and administrators, even some psychiatrists, seem to believe that adjustment to a society, in the sense of complete conformity with the goals, internal and external, of that society, is the goal of mental health. Such a view of adjustment would mean that in Rome you would not only do as the Romans do, but think and feel as the Romans do; that in a money-mad society you too would be money-mad; that in a Nazi society you would be a good Nazi. The "fully functioning personality" is not, in that sense, fully adjusted. His relation to the society around him may be described somewhat as follows: he is *in* and *of* the society of which he is a member, but he is not a prisoner of that society.

On the other hand, the "fully functioning personality" is not an outright rebel against social norms of a society either, given a half-way tolerable society to live in. Maslow writes as follows of his case-studies of "self-actualizing personalities":

Their behavior is marked by simplicity and naturalness, and by lack of artificiality and straining for effort. This does not necessarily mean consistently unconventional behavior. Actually the "self-actualizing personality" is not extremely unconventional. His unconventionality is not superficial but essential and internal. It is his impulse, thought, and consciousness that are unconventional, spontaneous and natural. Apparently recognizing that the world of people in which he lives could not understand or accept this, and since he has no wish to hurt people or to fight them over trivialities, he will go through the ordinary trivial conventions with a good-humored shrug and with the best possible grace. . . . But the fact that this "conventionality" is a cloak which rests very lightly on his shoulders and is easily cast aside can be seen from the fact that the self-actualizing person practically never allows convention to hamper him or inhibit him from doing anything that he considers very important and basic.

Now Carl Rogers states more or less the same thing when he says, "The fully functioning personality is not necessarily 'adjusted' to his culture, he is not a conformist. But at any time and in any culture he would live constructively, in as much harmony with the culture as a balanced satisfaction of his internal needs demanded." In other words, he can take his culture or he can leave it alone as is dictated by his deepest inner needs.

This, too, can be restated in the language of general semantics. One of the most important insights we get from general semantics is that human beings are a "symbolic class of life," from which follow our generalizations about the

relationships between symbols and what they stand for. Because we are a symbolic class of life, much of our behavior, many of our needs, are symbolic in addition to being functional.

Let me illustrate this in a humble way. When we are hungry, of course we must eat, but we often eat at more expensive restaurants than we can afford because we hope to symbolize by this choice of restaurant our high social status, and we want to avoid the distasteful low-status symbolism of the modest restaurant where the food is better and the prices are lower. To those whose symbol-systems are fixated and who have no self-insight, eating at the most expensive restaurant in town *is* success, while eating anywhere else *is* social disgrace. For symbol-fixated people this kind of identity equation holds for all other social symbols in the way of conspicuous consumption, social rituals, and social behavior. These are the people whose self-respect is *absolutely* dependent on the kind of clothes they wear, the kind of car they drive, the kind of society they are seen with. For these people clothes or cars or country club membership or social ritual are not symbols, but ultimate realities.

To know the difference between a symbol and that which is symbolized—the difference between map and territory—is a central idea in general semantics. Of course others before Korzybski had arrived at this conclusion, but Korzybski was alone in making this a central premise of his thinking. Once you have internalized the idea that the symbol is not that which is symbolized, then you come to realize that never to have been invited to join the country club does not mean that your life has been lived in vain, and, *per contra*, it also means that you are able to dine at the country club, when you have to, without acting as if it was going to kill you.

Summed up in general semantics terms, the optimum relation of an individual to his culture can be stated as follows: since the map is not the territory, since the symbol is not that which is symbolized, the semantically well-orientated person is primarily concerned with the territory and not with the map, with the social reality rather than the social façade.

**A** SECOND fact about the sane person is that, to an unusual degree, his own feelings and emotions, his own resentments and tensions, his attractions and his dislikes, are, in Carl Rogers' terms, "accessible to awareness." We all have what Rogers and others have called a "self-concept," that is, some kind of idealized picture of ourselves. Thus, we may think of ourselves as efficient or as inefficient, as hard-boiled or as kind-hearted, as lovable or as unlovable, or as artistic or as practical, etc. But also we all have impulses and feelings that do not fit our self-concepts, in that the man who thinks of himself as hard-boiled and tough may feel a twinge of humane sentiment that he would not know what to do with, or the person who thinks of himself as extremely gentle may suddenly find in himself a sadistic impulse. The self-defined highbrow may

feel a lowbrow urge to go to a prize-fight, while the husband who has been openly scornful of his wife's interest in modern art may unexpectedly find himself warming up to a painting by Miró. What so-called "normal" people do with these wellings of unexpected feeling that arise inside of them, is to suppress them, to deny them to awareness, since to admit them to awareness would mean the reorganization of their picture of themselves.

The way in which a genuinely psychologically healthy person differs from so-called "normal" people in this respect is that he is aware of his own feelings, he does not try to suppress them, he often acts upon them, and, even if he does not act upon them, he is able to admit them to awareness. Let me quote Rogers' description of this characteristic: "The person would be open to his own experience . . . In a person who is open to his experience . . . every stimulus, whether originating in the organism or in his environment, would be freely relayed through the nervous system without being distorted by defensive mechanisms." Carl Rogers talks about one of his patients:

Formerly he could not freely feel pain or illness, because being ill meant for him being unacceptable. Neither could he feel tenderness and love for his child, because such feelings meant being weak, and he had to maintain his façade of being strong. After therapy he can be genuinely open to the experiences of his organisms—he can be tired when he is tired, he can feel pain when his organism is in pain, he can freely experience the love he feels for his daughter, and he can also feel and express the annoyance for her when he feels annoyed . . . he can fully live the experiences of his total organism, rather than shutting them out of his awareness. I have used this concept of availability to awareness to try to make clear what I mean by openness to one's own experience. This might be misunderstood. I do not mean that this individual would be self-consciously aware of all that was going on in himself, like the centipede that became aware of all his legs. On the contrary, he would be free to live a feeling subjectively, as well as be aware of it. He might experience love, or pain, or fear. Or he might abstract himself from this subjectivity and realize in awareness, "I am in pain," "I am afraid," "I do love." But the crucial point is that there are no barriers inside himself, no inhibitions which would prevent the full experiencing of his own emotions.

Maslow also is interested in this subject and it is curious how Maslow and Rogers converge from different theoretical sources. Maslow says of the self-actualizing personality, "Their ease of penetration to reality, their closer approach to an animal-like or child-like acceptance and spontaneity imply a superior awareness of their own impulses, their own desires, opinions, and subjective reactions in general."

**T**Hese characteristics too can be translated into the language of general semantics. The first fundamental postulate of general semantics, as already indicated, is that the map is not the territory and the second postulate is that the map

is never *all* of a territory. Now, if we regard the self-concept as the map of the self, we may, if we identify the map with the territory, feel that the self-concept *is* the self, which it is not. In other words, if my self-concept defines me as a gentle, kind-hearted person, then *by definition* I don't *ever* have any cruel or sadistic impulses. If therefore sadistic impulses occur, they have to be denied to awareness. In other words, if my self-definition as gentle and kind-hearted is rigid enough, I cannot permit myself to be aware of my non-kindhearted impulses, rare as they may be. Therefore, in one respect at least, I shall be like the famous man who shouted, "You know goddam well I never lose my temper!"

Supposing, on the other hand, one were a good general semanticist, aware through internalization of the principle that the map is not all the territory, that the self-concept therefore is not all of the self. In such a case I should, even if I defined myself as "gentle and tender-hearted," realize that this definition does not say all about myself and therefore I should be compelled to state, "So far as I know, and in the situations in which I have found myself, I have been, up to now, on the whole, gentle and tender-hearted. But since I have not been in all possible situations, nor experienced all possible experiences, and since few of us are completely honest with ourselves, there no doubt exist within me feelings I have not recognized in myself, as well as potentialities for emotions that I have not yet had occasion to feel." With such an attitude towards one's own self-definitions we should indeed be, in Rogers' terminology, "open to our own experience."

In short, the serious student of general semantics, as of any other psychological discipline, extending his scientific principles to every concept, including his own concept of himself, would know that every map, including the map of the self, must shade off at the edges into a *terra incognita*. Therefore he expects the unexpected within the area of his own thoughts and feelings, and he is not compelled to deny these feelings to awareness.

Socrates said "Know thyself." But he also said, "Whatever authority I may have, rests solely upon my knowing how little I know." And what Socrates said about knowledge in general applies with special cogency to self-knowledge. The individual who says, "I know myself," does not know himself. It is the individual who knows how little he knows about himself who stands a reasonable chance of finding out something about himself before he dies.

**A**NOTHER thing about the genuinely sane person which is emphasized, although in different ways, by Rogers and Maslow is that since the map is not the territory, and since therefore knowledge about an event is never the event itself, those who take this fact for granted are not uncomfortable about the fact that they don't know the answers. Maslow says:

Our healthy subjects are uniformly unthreatened and unfrightened by the unknown, being therein quite different from average men. They accept

the unknown, they are comfortable with it, and, often are even attracted by it. To use Frenkel-Brunswick's phrase, "they can tolerate the ambiguous." . . . Since, for healthy people, the unknown is not frightening, they do not have to spend any time laying the ghost, whistling past the cemetery, or otherwise protecting themselves against danger. They do not neglect the unknown, or deny it, or run away from it, or try to make believe it really is known, nor do they organize, dichotomize, or rubricize it prematurely. They do not cling to the familiar, nor is their quest for truth a catastrophic need for certainty, for safety, for definiteness, and order. The fully-functioning personality can be, when the objective situation calls for it, comfortably disorderly, anarchic, vague, doubtful, uncertain, indefinite, approximate, inexact, or inaccurate.

There is another fundamental principle in general semantics with which many of you are perfectly familiar, namely, that of indexing and dating, as we call it in our terminology. The idea is, of course, that no two individual things or persons or events are ever identical, and that everything in the world is in process, with changes occurring constantly. We have that rule in form  $A_1$  is not  $A_2$ ; policeman<sub>1</sub> is not policeman<sub>2</sub>; and policeman<sub>1</sub> (this week) is not policeman<sub>1</sub> (next week), and so on. Most of our errors of evaluation arise, Korzybski said, from identification reactions, in which we ignore the differences between individuals of the same class name, and in which we ignore the changes that occur over time. Another name for the same principle in general semantics literature is extensionality, as opposed to intensionality. The extensional individual responds to similarities and differences; whereas the intensional individual tends to ignore differences among things that have the same name. This principle of intensional orientation is illustrated by the saying "A woman driver is, after all, a woman driver." The extensional individual is highly aware of things, people, and events at subverbal levels, where everything is in process.

It is gratifying to know that Maslow and Rogers describe the fully functioning personality as extensional if we can judge from the following accounts. In Rogers' paper, *Toward a Theory of Creativity*, this concept of openness to experience is further elaborated. Dr. Rogers says:

The creative person, instead of perceiving in predetermined categories ("trees are green," "college education is a good thing," "modern art is silly") is aware of this existential moment as it is, and therefore he is alive to many experiences which fall outside the usual categories (in *this* light this tree is purple; *this* college education is damaging; *this* modern sculpture has a powerful effect on me).

The creative person is in this way open to his own experiences. It means a lack of rigidity and the permeability of boundaries in concepts, beliefs, perceptions and hypotheses. It means a tolerance of ambiguity where ambiguity exists. It means the ability to receive much conflicting information without forcing closure on the situation.

Dr. Maslow has another way of saying this:

Self-actualized people have a wonderful capacity to appreciate again and again, freshly and naively the basic goods of life, with awe, pleasure, wonder, and even ecstasy, however stale these experiences may be for other people. Thus, for such people, every sunset is as beautiful as the first one, any flower can be breathtakingly lovely even after he has seen a million flowers. And the thousandth baby he sees is just as miraculous a product as the first one he saw.

And this is simply another way of stating the indexing principle. Thus, sunset<sub>1</sub> is not sunset<sub>2</sub>, flower<sub>1,000,000</sub> is not flower<sub>1,000,001</sub>, baby<sub>1000</sub> is not baby<sub>1001</sub>. And therefore experience continues to be fresh for the creative person.

Maslow describes this extensionality of self-actualizing people in social relationships in the following terms. "They can be and are friendly with anyone of suitable character regardless of class, education, political belief, race or color. As a matter of fact it seems as if they are not even aware of the differences which often mean so much to other people." In other words, the self-actualizing person *experiences at lower levels of abstraction* than the rest of us. He reacts to the specific Smith<sub>1</sub>, Smith<sub>2</sub>, etc. and therefore he concerns himself very little with high order abstractions such as "He is a Catholic," "He is a Republican," "He is a Negro," etc.

Maslow also says:

The first and most obvious level of acceptance to be found in the self-actualizing personality is at the so-called animal level. These self-actualizing people tend to be good and lusty animals, hearty in their appetites and enjoying themselves mightily without regret or shame or apology. They seem to have a uniformly good appetite for food, they seem to sleep well, they seem to enjoy their sexual lives without unnecessary inhibition, and so on for all the relatively physiological impulses. They are able to "accept" themselves not only at these lower levels, but at all levels as well, e.g., love, safety, belongingness, honor, self-respect. All these are accepted without question as worth while simply because they are part of human nature, and because these people are inclined to accept the work of nature rather than argue with nature for not having constructed things to a different plan. This interesting point shows itself in self-actualizing people by the lack of disgusts and aversions seen in average people and especially in neurotics, e.g., food annoyance, disgust with body products, body odors, and body functions . . . One does not complain about water because it is wet, nor about rocks because they are hard . . . As the child looks out upon the world with wide, uncritical and innocent eyes, simply noting and observing what is the case, without either arguing the matter or demanding that it be otherwise, so does the self-actualizing person look upon human nature both in himself and others.

**A**NOTHER curious fact which I find deeply meaningful and which Maslow points out arises from this child-like quality of perception and feeling in the self-actualized person which makes for a structure of ends and means different

from those of other people. For most people, almost everything they do is a means to an end. So far as people who are regarded as normal in the rat-race of American life are concerned, ends are often almost impossible to discover: they work in order to eat, they eat in order to work; they play golf in order to keep fit, and they keep fit in order to work better, and they work better in order to be able to afford their golf club fees. Maslow also says elsewhere that people even rationalize fishing by saying "it is important to be out in the open air," instead of regarding fishing as a pleasure in itself. Here is an example of ends-means relationship with respect to my own children. In Chicago we lived in an apartment with a self-operating elevator. I found that I pushed that button *in order to* get upstairs; but to my children I found that pressing the elevator button and releasing the amazing consequences of that act was a pleasure in itself, to be undertaken leisurely, zestfully, and with sparkling eyes. So it used to take us a very long time to get upstairs. But the point is that self-actualizing people, like children, enjoy as ends in themselves hundreds of little things that to ordinary people are only means. Dr. Rogers says of the same point:

Such living in the moment means an absence of rigidity, of tight organization, of the imposition of a structure. It means, instead, a maximum of adaptability, a discovery of structure in experience, of a flowing, changing organization of the self and of personality rather than the imposition of structure upon experience.

**A**NOTHER characteristic of the fully functioning personality is that he is a creative individual, sometimes creative in the usual sense of artist, musician, novelist, scientist, or political leader, but just as often creative in smaller, but equally genuine ways, that is, the ability of the carpenter, the office manager, the house-organ editor, the housewife, or the teacher to improvise, for the particular needs of a job at hand, out of the particular materials at hand, a unique and original solution of a problem, a solution that immediately strikes others with a thrill of pleasure so that they say, "How did you ever think of that!" This is what I mean by creativeness.

Maslow writes that there are no exceptions to the rule that self-actualizing people are creative in their own way.

Carl Rogers also has been concerned with this problem of creativity and he says that in a creative person and therefore a fully functioning person, "the locus of evaluation is in the self." It isn't what teachers think, it isn't what the Ph.D. committee thinks, it isn't what the neighbors think, it's what *I* think that matters. Because the fully functioning person's experience, past and present, are accessible to awareness, because he sees freshly and without rigid categorizing or labeling of the situation before him, he ultimately is his own judge of what is the needed solution for any given problem. After all, the solutions of others are merely the solutions of people who weren't in *this* situation, confronted with *this*

problem, with *these* materials or with *these* people to work with. Therefore, the fully functioning person, even if he may welcome the praise or admiration of others, is not dependent on others.

Perhaps from this we can give an account in general semantics terms of the creative process. Let me put it something like this: if you see in any given situation only what everybody else can see, you can be said to be so much a representative of your culture that you are a victim of it. In other words, you haven't even got the materials to be original with, since you have before you only "just another" sunset, "just another" tree, "just another" batch of left-overs in the icebox—these are the common abstractions. But if you are extensional about the world around you, open to the uniqueness of every object and event, if you are open, too, about your own feelings, namely, the uniqueness of your tensions and needs at this moment, and of those around you, what is before you is *not* "just another" sunset, or "just another" tree, or "just another" batch of left-overs. And the act of bringing together the uniqueness of yourself at that moment with the uniqueness of your materials at the moment and the uniqueness of other people's feelings at that moment into the solution of the problem is the act of creativity: whether the end-product takes the form of a painting, a sonata, a plan for prison reform, or a new kind of casserole dish.

I SHOULD like to call in another source of insight on the subject by quoting from the poet and novelist, D. H. Lawrence, when he talks about art. What he says about art seems to me exactly equivalent to what Maslow and Rogers say about the relationship of a genuinely sane person to the world around him:

The business of art is to reveal the relation between man and his circumambient universe, at this living moment. As mankind is always struggling in the toil of old relationships, art is always ahead of its "times," which themselves are always far in the rear of the living present.

When van Gogh paints sunflowers, he reveals, or achieves, the vivid relationship between himself, as man, and the sunflower, as sunflower, at that quick moment of time. His painting is not the sunflower itself. We shall never know what the sunflower is. The camera will visualize the sunflower far more perfectly than van Gogh ever did.

The vision on the canvas is a third thing, utterly intangible and inexplicable, the offspring of the sunflower itself and van Gogh himself. The vision on the canvas is forever incommensurable with the canvas, or the paint, or van Gogh as a human organism, or the sunflower as a botanical organism. You cannot weigh nor measure nor even describe the vision on the canvas . . .

It is a revelation of a perfected relation, at a certain moment, between man and a sunflower . . . and this perfected relation between man and his circumambient universe is life itself, for mankind . . . Man and the sunflower both pass away in a moment, in the process of forming a new relationship. The relation between all things changes from day to day, in a

subtle stealth of change. Hence art, which reveals or attains to another perfect relationship, will be forever new.

If we think about it, we find that our life consists in this achieving of a pure relationship between ourselves and the living universe about us. This is how I "save my soul" by accomplishing a pure relationship between me and another person, me and other people, me and a nation, me and a race of men, me and animals, me and the trees or flowers, me and the earth, me and the skies and sun and stars, me and the moon: an infinity of pure relations, big and little . . . This, if we knew it, is our life and our eternity: the subtle, perfected relation between me and the circumambient universe.

**F**INALLY, the fully functioning personality is ethical in the deepest sense. Maslow says that his sane people have a sense of right and wrong that is quite clear-cut, but that their evaluations are at deeper levels, rather than at the superficial levels that most people worry about. He says that ordinary "moral" problems fade out of existence for sane people:

It is not so much that the problem is solved as that it becomes clearly seen that it never was an intrinsic problem to start with, but it was only a sick-man-created one, e.g., whether or not one plays cards or dances, or wears short or long dresses, exposing the head in some churches and covering it in others, drinking wine, eating some meats and not others, or eating them on some days and not others.

For the fully functioning personality such problems are deflated. Rogers says on the same point that because the fully-functioning personality is non-defensive and because he therefore has access to his own needs and those of others, he can be counted on to be trustworthy and constructive. That is, the unsane individual is moral only with the greatest of effort and often he behaves unmorally and viciously with the best of moral intention. Whereas to the fully functioning personality, as Rogers, Maslow, and Korzybski see him, morality and ethics come naturally, as the result of proper evaluation. A person who is fully open to his own feelings and deeply aware of other people as well, can hardly act blindly or selfishly. He is deeply socialized, as Dr. Rogers says, because "one of his own deepest needs is for affiliation and communication with others. When he is most fully himself—'selfish'—he cannot help but be most deeply identified with others too and therefore his orientation is social in the best sense."

**T**HIS picture of the sane person may sound like an impossible ideal. I don't want it to sound that way. What is the sane person like to meet? What does he look like? Well, he (or she) may be short or tall, may be thin or fat. He (or she) may wear false teeth or have fallen arches or bifocals. He (or she) may be child-like in some respects and therefore may look childish to his friends and neighbors. Because he is somewhat detached from his culture, he may seem cold and distant to others. But, most importantly, this sane person that I have

been describing in the abstract may suffer from anxiety and fear and doubt and foreboding—because such feelings can arise from non-neurotic sources in this troubled world—so that *externally he (or she) may look just as troubled and act just as troubled as a neurotic person*, because there *are* troubles in the world which cause doubt, anxiety, and foreboding. But his troubles would be real ones and not self-contrived ones.

I say this last because sometimes we speak of the goals of mental health as if they meant the hope of the emergence of completely happy people in a completely trouble-free world. If such were our goal, it would indeed be an impossible and unattainable one. Actually, it seems to me that the goals of mental health are much more modest. Sanity does not mean the solution of all problems (cultural or psychological or economic or whatever) but merely the abolition or avoidance of those problems which we create for ourselves through lack of self-insight.

Nevertheless, self-insight, as I think you will agree, is necessary and prior to all other kinds of insight. Self-insight is increased, of course, by experience—and by reflection upon experience. Further insights may be derived from literature, poetry, drama, and the arts. All these insights may be ordered and made more meaningful through the study of psychology, cultural anthropology, sociology, general semantics, and other such disciplines. If through such experiences, reflection, and study we are able to increase our self-insight, we shall have made a real start towards seeing more clearly, and therefore beginning to solve, the problems other than psychological that beset this troubled world.

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